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INTRODUCTION
This Essay is about how Restatements should be conceptual-
ized and drafted. It is not about whether they should be undertaken
in the first instance;1 nor is it about the proper role of tort in
American society.2 We assume that tort makes sense and that Re-
statements are helpful. Having recently served as Reporters on the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability,3 we want to share
our thoughts on the practical craft involved in drafting such a proj-
ect. We focus on the concepts of "intent" and "recklessness," defined
in sections 1 and 2 of the new Restatement (Third) of Torts: General
Principles (Discussion Draft) ("Discussion Draft"); 4 but we trust
that our comments have broader application.
1. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143
U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995).
2. See Marshall S. Shapo, Changing Frontiers in Torts: Vistas For the 70's, 22 STAN. L.
REV. 330 (1970).
3. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1998) [hereinafter PRODUCTS
LIABILITY].
4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES §§ 1-2 (Discussion Draft Apr. 5,
1999) [hereinafter Discussion Draft].
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I. CONCEPTUALIZING INTENT AND RECKLESSNESS
A. Some General Propositions Regarding Both Intent and
Recklessness
However one frames the concepts of intent and recklessness
in a Restatement, they must be kept generic, stable, and endoge-
nous. By "generic" we mean that the concepts should not be tied to
any single tort, or family of torts. For example, one frequently en-
counters philosophical treatments of tort that automatically link
intent with the causing of tangible harms, such as personal injury
and property damage.5 Apparently, intent and harm are coupled in
this manner in order to contrast intentional infliction of harm with
negligently harmful conduct. 6 But to inextricably link intent with
tangible harm in a Restatement of Torts would constitute error-
intent has a wider range of applications in the tort system. Thus,
an actor may intentionally cause another to suffer harm other than
tangible harm-for example, economic loss, 7 injury to reputation,8
or pure emotional upset 9-under circumstances that make the ac-
tor's conduct tortious. Indeed, an actor may commit an intentional
tort without intending any harm whatsoever. 0 The definition of
intent must, therefore, be kept generic so that it can help to define
a wide range of different torts." The same rule applies to reckless-
ness. One may recklessly cause not only tangible harm to persons
or property, but also economic loss, injury to reputation, and pure
5. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, Intention in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT
LAW 229 (David G. Owen ed., 1995).
6. See Discussion Draft, supra note 4, § 1 cmt. a; see also David G. Owen, Philosophical
Foundations of Fault in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 201 (David G.
Owen, ed. 1995).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B (1965) (discussing intentional interference
with a prospective contract relation).
8. Id. § 580A (discussing defamation).
9. Id. § 46 (discussing intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress).
10. For example, when A intentionally touches B in a manner that a reasonable person
would find offensive, A commits an offensive battery on B even if A intends no harm, including
offense, to B. See id. §§ 18, 19. The proper test for offensive contact is completely objective-a
contact which is unwarranted by the social usages prevalent at the time and place at which it is
inflicted." Id. § 19 cmt. a. In effect, A is held strictly liable for having acted in ignorance of
prevalent social usages.
11. The Discussion Draft acknowledges that this is, to some extent, a wvorthwhile objective.
See Discussion Draft, supra note 4, at Reporter's Introductory Note (CjT]he definitions of intent
[and] recklessness... as set forth are capable of applying in cases involving all types of harms.").
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emotional upset unaccompanied by personal injury or property
damage. 12
Both intent and recklessness must also be kept stable in the
sense that they must have the same meaning whenever employed in
defining tortious acts. The Restatement drafter must be able, in
other words, to offer a definition that remains constant whenever
used in this Restatement.18 The concept of intent is too fundamental
to be allowed to shift meanings across different factual contexts.
Finally, intent and recklessness must be kept endogenous to tort
without adjusting for how those elements are conceptualized in
nonlegal contexts or in legal contexts other than tort. Thus, the fact
that in Shakespeare's tragedies "intent" may carry a special mean-
ing that helps the playwright achieve dramatic impact, 14 or the fact
that "intent" has a special meaning in criminal statutes," should be
irrelevant to the drafter of a Restatement of Torts. A Restatement of
Torts speaks to, and only to, the tort system of which it is a con-
stituent part. Other systems-Shakespearian tragedies, systems of
criminal justice, and the like-should be left to conceptualize intent
and recklessness on their own, perhaps quite differently.
A few further generalizations are in order. Both intent and
recklessness involve subjective states of mind. Depending on the
particular context, they may be coupled with objective evaluative
standards, 16 but a particular state of mind is always implicated. 17
Moreover, while recklessness necessarily implies wrongfulness from
a tort perspective, intent does not. Of course, for the causative act
to be tortious, the intended consequence will more often than not be
antisocial. But it need not be-one may intend consequences of
one's act that are, from the actor's reasonable perspective, benign, 18
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (discussing reckless conduct causing sevoro emo-
tional distress); see also id. § 558 (explaining that fault amounting to at least negligence is a
required element of defamation claim).
13. See, e.g., id. § 8A ("The word 'intent is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject
to denote....") (emphasis added).
14. We made this up-although there may be something to it. Any English majors out
there?
15. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(12) (1962) (defining "intentionally" and "with intent," and
equating intent with purpose).
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 865 (interference with the right to vote or hold
office "by a consciously wrongful act [that] intentionally deprives another of [that] right ... .
Regarding recklessness, see notes 48-49, infra, and accompanying text.
17. Negligence requires no state of mind other than the volition necessary to commit an
"act." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 281-82.
18. For example, ifA kisses B under the mistaken and reasonable belief that B, a stranger,
desires what would otherwise constitute an offensive contact, A has committed a prima facie
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or even socially beneficial. 19 In these latter circumstances, if tort
liability for the harmful consequences of the act is imposed on the
actor, a form of strict liability (without fault or moral blame) will be
involved.20 It follows that the oft-encountered "culpability spec-
trum," suggesting a natural progression from negligence to reck-
lessness to intentional tort,21 is neither necessarily accurate nor
particularly helpful. Contrary to such a construct, some intentional
torts properly involve what amounts to strict liability for the in-
tended consequences of reasonable, well-meaning conduct.22
Finally, it must be understood that the concept of a legal
"act" logically precedes, but does not necessarily implicate, both in-
tent and recklessness. 23 Common parlance occasionally (and errone-
ously) suggests that all "acts" are necessarily "intentional," and
therefore actors may be said to cause, intentionally, all of the direct
consequences of their acts.24 To go this far, of course, robs intent of
its potential for doing useful work. In other words, "all acts lead to
intended consequences" is far too broad a construct. The way to
avoid difficulty is to conceptualize acts as "volitional," rather than
necessarily "intended, '25 thereby allowing the concepts of intent and
recklessness to focus on the consequences of acts, rather than on
the acts themselves. 26 Thus, if an actor throws a rock and hits a
tree, the act of throwing the rock is manifestly volitional, but it is
not usefully characterized as intentional when exploring the possi-
bility of the actor's liability for causing harm to the tree.2 Whether
battery even though A's conduct is reasonable under the circumstances. If B's conduct consti-
tutes a manifestation of consent, of course, A may be privileged. Id. § 892(2).
19. The same analysis in note 10, supra, applies when A touches B for the beneficial pur-
pose of setting a fracture in H's arm while administering unconsented-to first aid. A may or may
not be privileged to contact B, but prima facie, A has committed a battery and has some ex-
plaining to do.
20. In effect, A has trespassed onto 's person in the hypotheticals set forth in notes 10 and
19, supra. As a trespasser, A acts at his peril in the absence of a privilege.
21. Cf. supra note 6 and accompanying text.
22. See supra note 20 and accompanying text
23. '?he word 'act is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote an external
manifestation of the actor's will and does not include any of its results, even the most direct, im-
mediate and intended." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 2 (emphasis added).
24. DAN DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 48 (2000); see also Discussion Draft, supra note 4, § 1
cmt. e.
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 2 cmt a.
26. See supra note 23. The Discussion Draft appears to substitute "intentional act" for 'vo-
lition," placing itself in the awkward position of admitting, we believe mistakenly, that intent
has a role to play regarding acts, quite apart from their consequences. See Discussion Draft,
supra note 4, § 1 cmt c.
27. If the focus of attention were on the actor's liability for harming the rock by coming into
contact with it in the first instance, then the act would be reaching to pick it up and the conse-
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or not the consequence of hitting the tree is intended depends, as
the next Section will explore, upon the actor's state of mind re-
garding that particular consequence. In any event, to assert that
the actor "acted" by throwing the rocks tells us nothing about the
particular consequences of that act, nor the actor's state of mind
regarding those consequences.
B. Conceptualizing Intent
Assuming that a distinction has been successfully drawn be-
tween volition (part of the meaning of "act") and intent (relating to
the consequences of acts); and that, properly conceived, intent is
neither necessarily linked with tangible harm nor inherently
wrongful; one must still identify the state(s) of mind that constitute
intent on the part of an actor to cause a particular consequence of
an act. Upon reflection, two (and only two) states of mind qualify.
An actor intends the consequence of an act when the actor desires
that consequence to follow; 28 and an actor intends the consequence,
even if the actor does not desire the consequence, if she is aware
that the consequence is certain to follow and goes ahead and acts
with that awareness. 29
The first of these states of mind-desire-comports with the
common understanding of intent and requires no elaboration. 0 The
second-awareness-requires further discussion. Before addressing
the substantive merits of this second branch of intent, a bit of
housekeeping is in order. An actor may be aware of certain conse-
quences in one of at least two senses: the actor may know that the
consequence is certain to follow from the act; or the actor may be-
lieve that it will follow. The difference between these two versions
of awareness-knowledge and belief-lies in their relative levels of
implicit commitment to the underlying truth of the causal link be-
quence would be contact with the rock. Thus, distinguishing "act" from "consequence" is contox-
tual and depends on the nature of the inquiry.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A.
29. Id.
30. One might quibble with the precise word, if this were a matter of first impression. In.
deed, the word "desire" was not used in the original Restatement, which relied on the concept of
doing an act "for the purpose of causing" a consequence. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 13
cmt. d (1934). The Restatement (Second) introduced "desire" in Section 8A; and the Discussion
Draft of the Restatenent (Third) also uses "desire" in Section 1(a). It should be noted that a
defendant may desire a result without believing that it is substantially certain, or even very
likely, to result. Thus A may shoot in B's direction desiring to kill him and yet, given his own
sense of his lack of skills as a marksman, not believe that the bullet will strike B.
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tween the act and the consequence. To say that an actor "knows"
something implies that the "something" actually, or at least very
probably, exists.3' To say that an actor "believes" something, in con-
trast, is more agnostic in this regard. Indeed, to say that someone
"believes" something subtly signals that the "something" may exist
only in the actor's mind.3 2 As between these two versions of aware-
ness, "believes" is preferable to "knows" in giving content to the
second branch of intent.33
Assuming that "belief' is preferable to "knowledge" in gaug-
ing the awareness version of intent, one must then consider why
courts should recognize this second branch of intent in the first
place. One response may be rejected at the outset. In many, if not
most, instances, proof that a rational actor believes that a conse-
quence is certain to follow constitutes strong circumstantial proof
that the actor desires the consequence to follow.3 But if that were
all there were to this second, belief-based branch of intent, it would
not deserve to be recognized independently from desire. The law of
torts already contains general rules recognizing the power of cir-
cumstantial proof,3 5 and it is unnecessary to memorialize particular
examples in the substantive black letter of a Restatement.16 At
most, a Comment regarding the efficacy of circumstantial proof
would suffice, if the only relevance of belief in this context were
that it constitutes circumstantial proof of desire.
31. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1064 (2d ed. 1987) (de-
fining "know" as "I. to perceive or understand as a fact or truth; to apprehend clearly and with
certainty... .") [hereinafter RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY].
32. Id. at 190 (defining "believe" as "1. to have confidence in the truth, the existence, or the
reliability of something, although without absolute proof that one is right in doing so").
33. By analogy with the privilege of self-defense, by which an actor is privileged to use force
against another based on a reasonable, albeit erroneous, belief that the actor is being threatened,
so here an actor should be said to "intend" a consequence when the actor believes (even unrea-
sonably and erroneously, in this context) that the consequence is substantially certain to follow.
With regard to the privilege of self-defense, the actor "gets credit," as it were, for a sincere belief
that he is being threatened with force. So the actor should "take blame" when he sincerely be-
lieves a result is certain to follow. Requiring belief in the former context to be reasonable pro-
tects the victim from unwarranted acts of aggression. Abandoning reasonableness in the latter
context serves the same purpose. In that setting, the actor, as an unprivileged volunteer who
perceives no threat from the victim, can stay his hand and not act at all. If the actor acts with
the sincere belief that a harmful consequence to the victim is substantially certain to follow, the
victim deserves protection from the actor whether the actor's belief is reasonable or unreason-
able.
34. DOBBS, supra note 24, at 48.
35. See JAMEs A. HENDERSON ETAL., THE TORTS PROCESS 108-10 (5th ed. 1999).
36. The major exception is res ipsa loquitor. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D
(1965).
2001] 1139
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
As one might suspect, however, that is not all there is to the
belief-based branch of intent. At least two factual circumstances
support the conclusion that an actor who believes that a conse-
quence is substantially certain to follow nevertheless does not nec-
essarily subjectively desire that consequence to occur. The first in-
volves an actor whose act is certain to cause two or more conse-
quences, only one of which the actor desires to occur. Some observ-
ers refer to this circumstance as involving "double effect" and de-
bate whether the actor should be said to "intend" the undesired
consequence. 37 In the clearest example of double effect, the actor
very much regrets the undesired consequence, but proceeds never-
theless because the benefits to the actor of effecting the desired
consequence outweigh the actor's regret regarding the undesired
consequence. In essence, the actor believes that accomplishing the
one necessitates causing the other. For tort purposes, at least, the
actor should be said to intend the undesired consequence that is
substantially certain to follow from the actor's act.38
The second factual circumstance in which an actor may be-
lieve that a consequence is certain to follow from an act, but never-
theless not subjectively desire that result, involves a breakdown in
thought processes brought on by mental disability. A very young
child, for example, or a mentally deficient adult, may act believing
that a consequence is certain to follow and nevertheless lack the
desire to achieve that consequence.3 9 (Such actors are not able, in
common parlance, "to put two and two together.") The interesting
question from the tort perspective is whether such an actor should
be held to intend the consequence. If a finding of intent brings tort
liability, that liability will be "strict" in the full sense of the word. If
such strict liability is unattractive, the really interesting question
is whether occasional instances of undesirable strict liability are
more than offset by the more frequent and more clearly appropriate
imposition of liability in our earlier example of double effect. As-
37. See Phillippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect, 5 OXFORD
REV. 5 (1967) (explaining the double effect doctrine and criticizing its application to the abortion
question).
38. Indeed, given the real or perceived constraints on the alternatives available to the actor,
the actor may be said actually to "desire" the seemingly unintended consequence in the sense
that the actor prefers to cause it rather than to avoid causing it by refraining from acting. Thus,
the position "I wish I didn't have to cause this second consequence" could always be followed by
the statement "But given existing constraints, I prefer (desire) to cause that consequence rather
than not to act at all."
39. The best-known example is probably Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955)
(holding that a five year-old boy "intended" a consequence that the trier of fact found that he did
not desire to occur).
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suming that any attempt in the black letter to distinguish between
the two forms of belief-based intent-double effect and mental
breakdown-will prove futile,4 0 the best approach is probably for
the black letter to recognize belief-based intent in generic terms
that include both double effect and mental breakdown, and then to
recognize in the Comments the problems posed by instances of men-
tal breakdown. 41
One further issue regarding the conceptualization of intent
remains to be considered. Earlier we distinguished between the vo-
lition inherent in the concept of "act" and the intent that actors of-
ten possess regarding the consequences of their acts.42 One must
still distinguish between the proximate consequences of discrete
acts, on the one hand, and the inevitable consequences of general
courses of conduct, on the other. The problem at issue is similar to
the one eliminated by refusing to treat all consequences of acts as
inherently intended. Here the focus is not on the relationship be-
tween "intent" and "act" but instead on the relationship between
"act" and "consequence." Two recurring factual circumstances must
be excluded from what is meant by "the consequences of an act,"
lest the concept of "intended consequences" once again be cast too
broadly. Whenever an actor undertakes a course of repetitious con-
duct-for example, batting in the lineup for a major league baseball
club throughout a long season-some types of unhappy conse-
quences are, sooner or later, virtually certain to occur. For a batter
in the major leagues, hitting foul balls into the stands, thereby
striking patrons, is certain to occur from time to time across many
thousands of swings of a bat.43 Yet, in connection with any given
swing, not only does the batter not desire to -hit a foul ball when he
swings the bat, he does not believe that such a consequence is cer-
tain-or even very likely-to follow. The player understands at the
outset of the baseball season that foul balls will inevitably occur;
but the "act" referred to in the phrase "one intends the consequence
of an act" is the discrete act of swinging a bat at a pitched ball, not
the deliberate undertaking of the course of conduct involved in bat-
40. Even five year-olds, as in Garratt, supra note 39, can desire to harm others. To open the
door-even a crack--to arguments that "I believed harm was substantially certain, but I didn't
really desire W' would threaten to devour the sensible liability rule covering double effect.
41. A Comment could indicate that, in extreme instances where the argument against li-
ability is especially compelling, the court could rule-or the jury find-that the requisite belief
was absent
42. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
43. As used here, "striking" includes impacting the hands of a patron attempting to catch a
foul ball
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ting regularly in a major-league lineup. Properly conceptualized,
intent focuses on discrete acts, not general courses of conduct.44
The other problematic fact pattern in connection with repeti-
tious activity is similar to the first in that it threatens automati-
cally and counterproductively to convert clearly unintended conse-
quences into consequences intended in the belief-with-certainty
sense. In these cases, the requirement of a discrete act (rather than
a prolonged, repetitive course of conduct by the defendant actor) is
satisfied, but the consequence in question is certain to follow only
in the sense that it is inevitable in light of a repetitive course of
conduct by outside agents interacting with a continuing and dan-
gerous circumstance created by the defendant's discrete act. For
example, suppose that an employer permanently removes a safety
feature from a machine at a workplace, in order to increase the ma-
chine's productivity, without any subjective desire to harm anyone
by such removal. Permanent removal of the safety feature creates a
virtual certainty that, sooner or later, a worker will suffer the type
of injury that the safety feature would have prevented. The em-
ployer has performed a discrete act of removal-it is akin to a sin-
gle swing of a bat, rather than batting in the lineup for the season.
Yet, because injury is neither desired nor substantially certain to
result from any given worker's interaction at any given moment
with the unprotected machine, the injury should be held to be no
more intended by the employer than is the foul ball struck by our
44. See DOBBS, supra note 24, at 48; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
Some have argued that strict liability for defectively manufactured products is supported by an
intent rationale. That is, manufacturers who distribute hundreds of thousands of units know
that their quality control is not perfect and thus some small number of units will be dofectivo
and cause injury. They are thus considered to intend the injuries. See, e.g., Thomas A. Cowan,
Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077, 1087-92 (1965); Paul A. LoBel,
Intent and Recklessness as Bases of Products Liability: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward, 32
ALA. L. REV. 31, 67 (1980). Given the view set forth in the text, intent would not support liability
for products liability. The undertaking of general conduct of selling products that ultimately will
cause harm to someone, is too broad and unfocused to support liability based on intent. In the
context of manufacturing defects, reliance on intent as a policy reason to support liability,
though erroneous, is essentially harmless. Liability for such defects is truly strict. In the case of
generic defects, the idea that intent should be grounds for imposing liability is not benign, The
overwhelming majority of generic defect cases are based on "conscious design" choices made by
manufacturers. The issue is not whether the defendant acted with knowledge to substantial
certainty that the product would cause harm to some persons. It is inevitable that reasonably
designed products will cause injury. Risk-utility balancing presupposes that well-designed prod-
ucts carry with them risks. Indeed, LeBel, supra, at 45-49, recognizes that intent standing alone
cannot serve as a predicate for liability. He nonetheless suggests that proceeding under an intent
cause of action (with a risk-utility defense) would benefit plaintiffs. For the reasons set forth in
the text, we disagree.
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hypothetical batter.45 The way out of this conceptual difficulty is to
insist that, for a consequence to be intended in the "belief with cer-
tainty" sense, not only must the act producing the consequence be
discrete, but the consequence complained of must result directly
and proximately (both temporally and spatially) from the act.46
C. Conceptualizing Recklessness
As we have seen, intent involves subjective states of mind-
desire and belief-that have no necessary connection with wrongdo-
ing. One may intend to cause a benign, or even a beneficial, conse-
quence. 47 In contrast, recklessness presents more of a mixed bag.
Recklessness has both a subjective component (awareness that one
is creating a serious and relatively easily avoidable risk of harm to
others) and an objective component (one's conduct, assessed objec-
tively, must be negligent).48 (Recklessness may be said to be "negli-
gence with an attitude.") Knowledge, rather than belief, is the ap-
propriate form of awareness in this context, given the requirement
that the actor's conduct must actually, not merely apparently, cre-
ate a risk of injury to others. And the actor's knowledge must relate
not only to the seriousness of the risks created but also to the rela-
tive ease with which those risks might be reduced or eliminated.
This latter element supports the conclusion that the reckless actor
is callously indifferent to the welfare of others.49
This last observation presents an issue similar to one posed
in the preceding discussion of belief-based intent: If an actor knows
that the risk created is both substantial and easily avoided, is such
45. The fact pattern described in the text recurs in the context of injured workers bringing
intentional tort claims against their employers for maintaining unsafe work premises. E.g., Holtz
v. Schott Pattern Works Co., 626 N.E.2d 1029 (Ohio 1993). See generally ARTHUR LARSON, 6
LARSON'S IORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW §§ 103.03-.05 (2000). The court in Holtz v. Schott Pat-
tern Works Co. found that permanent removal of a safety guard raised a question of fact as to
whether the employer had acted with the intent to cause harm and thus was stripped of the
immunity of worker's compensation. Whether the offensive conduct warrants depriving the em-
ployer of the immunity of workers' compensation is beyond the scope of this Article. WYe note only
that the conduct of the employer is not intentional within the meaning of the classic tort defini-
tion of intent.
46. See DOBBS, supra note 24, at 48.
47. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 500.
49. Interestingly, Section 500 of the Restatement (Second) speaks ambiguously of the negli-
gent actor knowing or having reason to know "that such risk is substantially greater than that
which is necessary to make his conduct negligent." If one holds constant the burden of available
precautions to avoid injury, then this seems to be saying that the actor must know not only that
the risk exceeds the burden, (i.e. the actor is negligent), but that the risk substantially exceeds
it-i.e. that the burden of precautions is low relative to the risk.
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knowledge itself the legal equivalent of callous indifference, or must
the actor's state of mind subjectively include such indifference? The
test case, of course, would be the actor whose mental incapacities
prevent her from processing the relevant knowledge of risk to the
point of actually arriving at a mental state that includes deplorable
indifference toward the safety of others. Given that the concept of
recklessness, in contrast to intent, necessarily connotes wrongdo-
ing, the sort of strict liability involved in holding some very young,
or otherwise incapacitated, actors responsible for "intentionally"
causing undesired consequences is inappropriate in this context.50
It follows that for recklessness to be present, the actor must not
only know that the risk is great and easily avoidable, but she also
must subjectively entertain callous indifference to the plight of
would-be victims. 51
Thus far, we have spoken of recklessness in connection with
acts that cause tangible harm. Courts talk that'way,52 and the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts talks that way in its formal definition of
recklessness. 53 Yet, it will be recalled that we advised against so
limiting the concept of intent because that concept has an addi-
tional role to play in defining tortious conduct causing purely in-
tangible losses (economic loss, emotional upset, and injury to repu-
tation).54 Is recklessness similar to intent in this regard? Putting
the question differently, can one imagine instances in which con-
duct may be said to be reckless because the actor thereby manifests
callous indifference toward the nonphysical well-being of others?
We submit that such instances are easily conjured-an actor may
recklessly cause emotional upset,55 or injury to reputation, or eco-
nomic loss. Indeed, the Restatement (Second) of Torts employs the
50. Because intent does not necessarily connote wrongdoing, see supra notes 18-19, impos-
ing strict liability on mentally incapacitated actors is arguably appropriate, see supra notes 40.
41. Strict liability, however, would clearly be inappropriate in connection with allegedly reckless
conduct. "No-fault recklessness," in other words, is an oxymoron.
51. In most cases, of course, callous indifference would be inferred factually (rather than
merely legally) from the element of knowledge.
52. See, e.g., Piacuba Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1285 (11th Cir. 1999).
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 500.
54. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
55. In Garland v. Herrin, 724 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1983), the court was faced with an action
brought by parents of a girl who, while the parents were asleep in their bedroom, was bludg-
eoned to death by her boyfriend in one of the other bedrooms of the house. Defendant conceded
that he "recklessly" caused the plaintiffs severe emotional distress but denied he had done so
"intentionally." On appeal, the Second Circuit found no authority that New York would allow for
a cause of action based on reckless infliction of severe emotional distress. The court recognized
that Section 46(1) of the Restatement (Second) broadened the tort to include recklessness but
declined to accept the Restatement's position as reflective of the law of New York.
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recklessness concept in several such contexts notwithstanding the
fact that its formal definition of recklessness is tied to tangible
harm.56
II. CHOOSING APPROPRIATE RESTATEMENT LANGUAGE TO
EXPRESS THESE CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF INTENT AND
RECKLESSNESS
A. A Short Primer of Do's and Don't's for Drafting Restatement
Black Letter
Literature abounds explaining legal draftsmanship. Books
and articles are available offering guidance in drafting all varieties
of business agreements, 57 donative instruments,"8 legislation,5 9 legal
memoranda, 60 and judicial opinions.61 To our knowledge, however,
published guidance for drafting Restatements is not to be found.
Perhaps the demand for such guidance is all but nonexistent. Or
perhaps would-be authors-retired Restatement Reporters-are too
jaded, or too pooped, to make the effort.62 For better or worse, we
now undertake to fill this gaping void.
1. The Restatement Drafter Should Strive to Be Concise-All Things
Equal, the Fewer Words in the Black Letter and Comments, the
Better
This might seem obvious, but it is often forgotten. Many, if
not most, Restatement Reporters are legal academics whose in-
56. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 500.
57. See, e.g., Barbara Child, The Study of Contract Draftizg Strategy: Exercises in Mine De-
tection, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 279 (1992); James W. Martin, Tips for Writing the Contract that Stays
Out of Court (with forms), PRAC. REAL EST. LAW., May 1998, at 55.
58. See Ted Ellinghaus et al., Common Problems in 1111 Drafting, 68 L. INST. J. 35 (1994);
see also Gerry W. Beyer, Drafting in Contemplation of Will Contests, PRAC. LAW., Jan. 1992, at
61.
59. See William D. Warren, UCC Drafting: Method and Message, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 811
(1993).
60. See Roland A. Paul, An Easy Way to Write Good Legal Memos, PRAC. LAW., Sept. 1990,
at 27.
61. See George Leggett, Judicial Writing. An Observation by a Teacher of Writing, 6
SCRiBESJ. LEGAL WRITING 137 (1996.1997).
62. We confess that our five.year-plus stint as Reporters on the products liability project
leaves us neither jaded nor pooped. As we have acknowledged publicly, "Drafting the Restate-
ment has been an exhilarating experience." James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Arriving
at Reasonable Alternative Design" The Reporters' Travelogue, 30 U. MICH. J. L REFORM 563, 588
(1997).
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stincts, encouraged by law review writing, run toward long-
windedness. 63 It took us several years working on the products li-
ability project to appreciate the value of conciseness. Even toward
the end, when we thought we had a super-tight draft, helpful critics
found ways to save words. Legal archaeologists who bother to look
will observe this principle reflected in the sequences of preliminary
drafts of the products liability project published and circulated for
discussion and revision.64 Several important black letter provisions
of our project, such as those dealing with inferences of defect6 5 and
economic loss 66 , illustrate this point dramatically. Of course, there
is such a thing as too much conciseness-the goal here is optimal-
ity.67
2. The Drafter Should Avoid Introducing Empty Terms of Art
An "empty term of art" is a term that has no meaning other
than a formal definition expressed in one, or a very few, plain
words. Suppose that the process of conceptualization described ear-
lier were to reveal that a proper principle of tort is that one who
kicks another person commits a tort. Let us further assume that the
person framing the relevant discourse is tempted to substitute "poo-
poo" as the operative verb, so that the principle would be "one who
poo-poo's another commits a tort," making clear that "poo-poo's"
invariably means "kicks." The principle here invoked would urge
that the empty term "poo-poo" be avoided and that the rule be ex-
pressed simply as "one who kicks another commits a tort."6 8 The
principle retains power even when the term of art has two mean-
ings. For example, if "poo-poo" means "kicks or punches," the
drafter should consider substituting those terms for the empty term
of art. Countervailing considerations include whether the term of
art provides an easy, short-hand way of expressing one or more re-
63. Of the seven Restatement projects underway in 1999, all of the Reporters wore law pro-
fessors, along with all three Associate Reporters. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE/AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMTTEE ON CONTINUING
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION, DIRECTORY (1999).
64. The ALI maintains archives containing all published drafts, circulated proposed
amendments, votes at annual meetings, and the like. We donated all our papers, rough drafts
with marginal commentary, and the like in connection with the Products Liability Restatement.
They are housed at the University of Pennsylvania Law School library.
65. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 3, § 3.
66. See id. § 21.
67. Cf. Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974).
68. Cf. Alf Ross, T6-Ta, 70 HARv. L. REV. 812 (1957).
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curring concepts that require many more words to define;69 whether
the term of art carries meaning of its own that is helpful when fill-
ing in gaps in the underlying concept; 70 or whether the term of art
has a long tradition and is deeply ingrained in the language of
tort.7 1 A particularly interesting story in this regard involves judi-
cial reliance on the term "malice" in connection with the first-
amendment privilege in defamation law.72
3. The Drafter Should Avoid Introducing New Terminology Unless a
Radical Break with Tradition is Called For
This principle is closely related to the empty-term principle.
Quite simply, Restatement drafters should draw on prevailing wis-
dom from the past when they set about to express legal concepts in
words. Drafters who are academics must work especially hard to
remember that they are not writing a law review article-or a stat-
ute, for that matter. Relating the black letter to new ways of talk-
ing about tort should be left to the Comments or, better yet, the Re-
porter's Notes. Radical departures from tradition are rarely justi-
fied in a Restatement. When the situation arises, new terminology
may be appropriate; but it should be used with great caution.
4. The Drafter Should Define Workhorse Terminology
"Workhorse terminology" connotes important, linchpin terms
upon which a Restatement relies heavily and whose meaning may
not be self-evident. The required definitions may be included in op-
erative black letter provisions or in separate definitional sections.
At the very least, the Comments should flesh out the meanings of
technical terms that arguably do not require formal definition in
69. The term "intent," itself, is a good example. One could insert the content of Section SA of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts in place of "intent" every place the latter term is employed; but
doing so would be unwieldy.
70. A clear example in the Discussion Draft is Section 7, dealing with emergency. "Unex-
pected emergency" is defined as "an unexpected situation requiring rapid response." But since
the word "emergency" presumably carries meaning of its own, the related concepts of"unexpect-
edness" and "rapid response" are employed parenthetically. Query:. Is the term "unexpected
emergency" redundant?
71. "Intent" retains its independent vitality, in part, for this reason.
72. See Masson v. New Yorker Mag., 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991) ("Actual malice under the
New York Times standard should not be confused with the concept of malice as an evil intent or
motive arising from spite or ill wilL"); see also Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaugh-
ton, 491 U.S. 657, 666 (1989) ("It also is worth emphasizing that the actual malice standard is
not satisfied merely through a showing of ill will or 'malice' in the ordinary sense of the term.");
Westmoreland v. CBS Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1170, 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) C' 'Malice' in this context
does not carry its dictionary definition: it is a word of art. .. ").
20011 1147
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
the black letter. We confess to having violated this principle, quite
self-consciously, in at least one instance in the products liability
Restatement.73
5. In Connection with Definitions, the Drafter Should Define the
Term Used in the Black Letter
If the black letter uses the verb "intend," one should not de-
fine the noun "intent" unless that term is also used in the black let-
ter. The same applies for the adjective, "intentional."
6. The Drafter Should Avoid the Gratuitous Use of Synonyms
Most of us were taught that using synonyms is a sign of good
writing and that Roget's Thesaurus is our best friend. Quite the op-
posite is true of technical legal writing, especially in connection
with Restatement drafting. Pairs of words and phrases like "believe"
and "know," "harm" and "injury," "causes" and "brings about," and
"acting" and "engaging in conduct" might very well be adequate
substitutes for one another but they should not be used inter-
changeably in a Restatement.7 4 In the context of a Restatement,
Gertrude Stein got it right: "A rose is a rose is a rose."
7. The Drafter Should Limit the Meanings of Technical Terms to
the Project at Hand
The drafter of a Restatement of Torts should not define tech-
nical terms differently than they would otherwise be defined for
tort purposes simply to allow such definitions to serve in other (al-
beit related) nontort legal contexts. The tort system must relate
intelligently with other subsystems within the larger legal system.
But little, if anything, is to be gained-and much may be sacri-
ficed-when constituent conceptual elements of the tort system are
modified so that they can do service in other legal subsystems. 75
73. See PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note3, § 8(c), wherein the term "remanufactured" is
used but never defined or even discussed.
74. Interestingly, three of these four sets of terms are used interchangeably in the
Discussion Draft. See infra notes 95-96, 110 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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B. Some Comments on Comments
Unlike Reporters' Notes, which are unofficial and for which
only the Reporters are responsible, Comments are part of the Insti-
tute's official work-product. Substantively, they serve to flesh out
and clarify the meaning of the black letter. They also may supply
the historical antecedents of the black letter 76 and place the black
letter in the context of the purposes sought to be achieved. 77 In the-
ory, at least, Comments should not do the work of black-letter pro-
visions; they should not introduce rules or standards of decision not
contained in the black letter, nor should they modify the substance
of the black letter significantly. When a proposed final draft of a
Restatement contains Comments that appear to carry too much sub-
stantive freight, the odds are very great that the substantive mes-
sages of those Comments are the result of compromise. In these
situations, provisions, urged by a substantial number of Institute
members to be included in the black letter, were relegated to the
Comments. Although this is, as a general rule, inappropriate, some
critics believe that our own Restatement succumbed to it in at least
one instance. 78
As for the mode of expression to be used in the Comments,
the same standards urged earlier for the black letter apply here.
Drafters are sorely tempted, having toed the line with the black
letter, to revert to law review style in the Comments. Synonyms
creep into the discourse; new terminology gets casually introduced;
discussions of policy objectives are treated as though they come
from Mount Olympus. 79 All of these tendencies should be resisted.
76. In the products liability project we included Comments entitled "History" to serve this
purpose. See, e.g., PRODUCT LIABILITY, supra note 3, § 1 cmt. a.
77. In the products liability project we included Comments entitled "Rationale" to serve this
purpose. See, e.g., id. § 2 cmt. a.
78. See id. § 2, cmt. e. This came to be known as the "Habush amendment," after a promi-
nent Milwaukee plaintiffs lawyer who urged its inclusion as an amendment to the black letter of
section 2. The reason that the Reporters sought to place Comment e in the footnotes rather than
in the black letter, is that courts rarely declare product categories to be defective--courts refuse
to impose "category liability." The comment allows that in rare instances there may be occasion
to do so, but it stops short of endorsing the idea. To have elevated the comment into the black
letter would have made it appear that category liability is a staple of products liability law. In-
stead, we thought to convey the impression that only in the rarest of cases would the comment
come into play.
79. We solved this problem in our products liability project by putting the words in the
mouths of nameless courts and commentators. See, e.g., id. § 2 cmt. a C'Strict liability ... is
generally believed to foster several objectives.").
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The drafter's success in this regard depends considerably on those
assisting the drafting process. 80
C. Comments on Illustrations
As noted earlier, Illustrations help clarify the meaning of the
black letter and Comments. Frequently they are based on published
decisions, which are cited in the Reporters' Notes.81 To serve their
purpose, Illustrations must reach outcomes that seem preordained
once the relevant substantive provision is properly understood. Fact
patterns in so-called "gray areas," at the edge of a substantive pro-
vision's meaning, should not be employed in Illustrations.8 2 If the
black letter is ambiguous or uncertain, either the black letter or
Comments should be modified to clear up the ambiguity or uncer-
tainty, or the issue should be left for courts to resolve over time.
D. A Brief Sketch of How a Restatement of Torts Should-And
Should Not-Define Intent and Recklessness, Using the Second
Restatement as a Starting Place
1. The Definition of Intent
The definition of intent in section 8A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts meets the criteria set forth above and requires
little, if any, tinkering: The word "intent" is used throughout the
Restatement of this Subject to denote that the actor desires to cause
consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences
are substantially certain to result from it.83 This definition purports
to be generic-it is not tied to the causing of tangible harm, nor to
any single tort, or family of torts.84 It is stable in that it carries the
same meaning "throughout the Restatement." And it purports to be
endogenous in its pointed reference to "the Restatement of this
Subject," and makes no reference in the comments to other legal
areas in which "intent" is used. Section 8A reflects the two main
80. As our Preface indicates, id. at xvii, we received help from many sources. One Advisor,
in particular, stands out in connection with curbing our tendency to treat social policies as undo-
batable truths: Justice Hans A. Linde, of Oregon.
81. See, e.g., PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 3, § 2 Reporters' Note.
82. Classroom hypotheticals in law school are often intended to confound; Restatement Illus-
trations should always be aimed at clarifying.
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
84. The term is used in no fewer than twenty-one sections of the Restatement (Second).
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branches of intent, discussed earlier, and adopts the preferred con-
cepts and terminology: "desires" and "believes." Moreover, section
8A properly focuses on the causal relation between the "act" and its
"consequences." And in connection with the belief-based branch of
intent, it avoids reference to "conduct" or "activity" and focuses
squarely on "the [specific] consequences [that the actor believes] are
substantially certain to result from [the specific act in question.]"85
Affirming the adage, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it," we see nothing
to be gained in changing this black-letter definition in the proposed
new Restatement, except, of course, to eliminate the masculine pro-
nouns.
8 6
2. The Definition of Recklessness
The treatment of recklessness in the Restatement (Second) is
a different story from that of intent. Although the concept is relied
upon in a number of black-letter provisions,87 the only general defi-
nition appears in Section 500, entitled "Reckless Disregard of
Safety Defined":
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an
act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, know-
ing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to real-
ize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to an-
other, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary
to make his conduct negligent.93
This definition is problematic in several important respects. Refer-
ring to "physical harm to another," the definition on its face is not
generic as that term is used in this Essay.8 9 The reference to "does
an act or intentionally fails to do an act" is clumsy and redundant-
"acts or fails to act" would have sufficed. And why does the Re-
statement (Second's) definition make no explicit reference to the
actor's knowledge regarding the relative ease (low cost) with which
the risk could be avoided? As it stands, the definition appears to
embrace what could be described as "self-conscious gross negli-
gence." It will be recalled that the "bad attitude" on which the con-
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A; see supra note 84.
86. As is obvious to all, the earlier Restatements reflect a by-gone era in this regard. Need-
less to say, the Products Liability Restatement contains not a single such gender-specific refer-
ence, except in Illustrations where an actor's gender is clearly revealed by the name assigned to
that actor.
87. Reckless disregard and its variations appear in no fewer than eight sections of the Re.
statement (Second).
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 500.
89. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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cept of recklessness-or, even more so, "reckless disregard"-rests
is callousness so depraved that the actor knows not only that the
act is highly risky but also that it is gratuitously risky in the sense
that the actor could easily (at low cost) reduce or avoid the risk of
harm to others. 90 Without this dimension of self-conscious gratui-
tousness, the Restatement (Second)'s definition of "reckless disre-
gard" seems insufficient. Of course, if the phrase "substantially
greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent"
is read to refer to the extent to which the magnitude of the risk ex-
ceeds the burden of precaution, then by implication the actor knows
that the cost of avoiding the risk is relatively low. But we would
prefer that point to be made explicitly.
III. CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM OF THE DISCUSSION DRAFT'S
DEFINITIONS OF INTENT AND RECKLESSNESS
Before offering constructive criticism, we offer a heartfelt
disclaimer. The language we are about to examine is contained in a
Discussion Draft that is manifestly intended to encourage just
that-discussion. With this disclaimer in mind, and with the hope
of improving the end-product, we offer the following suggestions.
A. The Discussion Draft's Definition of Intent
The Discussion Draft defines the concept of intent in Section
1 of Chapter 1:
INTENT AND RECKLESSNESS: DEFINITIONS
§ 1. Intentional
An actor's causation of harm is intentional if the actor brings about that harm ei-
ther purposefully or knowingly.
(a) Purpose. An actor purposefully causes harm by acting with the desire to bring
about that harm.
(b) Knowledge. An actor knowingly causes harm by engaging in conduct believing
that harm is substantially certain to result.9
First, the draft reflects the basic structure of intent. Section
1 recognizes the two branches, and adopts "desire" and "believing"
90. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
91. Discussion Draft, supra note 4, § 1.
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as the operative terminology for each. Having said that, we have
problems with section 1. The first thing that strikes the eye is the
fact that Chapter 1 is entitled "Intent and Recklessness: Defini-
tions." And yet, the first term defined is the adjective, "intentional,"
not the noun, "intent." (Similarly, the second term, defined in sec-
tion 2, is "reckless," not "recklessness.") 92 In any event, the defini-
tion of "intentional" begins by linking the concept of intent to cau-
sation of harm, thereby eliminating the opportunity for the defini-
tion of intent to be generic to the same extent as in the Restatement
(Second).93 More importantly, linking intent with harm connotes
that intentional torts are necessarily wrongful in a moral sense-
that indeed, it suggests that intentional torts are necessarily more
wrongful than are torts involving recklessness. Linking the concept
of intent to wrongfulness in this manner overlooks the role that in-
tent properly plays in defining instances of strict liability without
fault.94
The terminology of intent, as well as the substance, is also
confused in this discussion draft. For example, section I substitutes
"brings about" for "causes" in the preamble.91 Then it switches to
"causes" and then back to "brings about" in subsection (a).96 And
then it switches back to "causes" in subsection (b). 97 Moreover, sub-
section (a) speaks of the actor "acting," whereas subsection (b)
speaks of the actor "engaging in conduct."98 As we observed in an
earlier discussion, "acting" is different from "engaging in conduct;"99
and the draft uses the latter term in precisely the context wherein
it does maximum mischief-the context of an actor intending a con-
sequence by believing that the consequence is substantially certain
to follow.100
When the draft splits intent into its two branches, it intro-
duces a new (at least to torts mavens) term: "purposefully."'101 Ac-
cording to the Comments, "purposefully" is borrowed from the
Model Penal Code. 0 2 As we explained earlier, this sort of borrowing
92. Id. § 2.
93. See supra note 85 and accompanying text
94. See Discussion Draft, supra note 4, § 2 cmt. a.
95. Id. § 1.
96. Id. § 1(a).
97. Id. § 1(b).
98. Id.
99. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
100. Discussion Draft, supra note 4, § 1 cmt. b.
101. See id. § 1.
102. Id. § 1 cmt. b.
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from'other systems is almost always a mistake.10 3 There is no rea-
son for the Restatement of Torts to utilize the same terminology as
does criminal law. And even if such borrowing is useful, the tort
Restatement drafter should at least borrow the term actually used
elsewhere-the Model Penal Code uses "purposely," not "purpose-
fully,"'1 4 and the two words have somewhat different meanings. 15 If
this were not confusing enough, Section 1 of the Discussion Draft
introduces "purposefully" in the preamble language and then de-
fines the term "purpose" in subsection (a).10 6 Section 1 exclusively
defines "purposefully" as "the desire to bring about the harm."'107 As
drafted, the term "purposefully" is what we earlier referred to as
"an empty term of art."08 That is, one could simply substitute the
concept of desire for that of purposefulness without making any
change in substance. 109 "Purposefully" appears to have been intro-
duced solely for the dubious purpose of linking section 1 with the
Model Penal Code. 110
The Discussion Draft's treatment of the "believing with sub-
stantial certainty" branch of intent, set out in subsection 1(b), is no
less problematic. The preamble refers to "knowingly" yet the term
defined in subsection (b) is "knowledge." More importantly, subsec-
tion (b) speaks of an actor "engaging in conduct," rather than "act-
ing." As we explained in an earlier discussion, employing the con-
cept of engaging in conduct suggests that general courses of con-
duct, deliberately engaged in, necessarily lead to intended conse-
quences. A general course of conduct might readily include playing
major league baseball or maintaining an inherently dangerous
workplace; yet, in neither example are foul balls or injured workers
necessarily "intended." Section 1 of the Discussion Draft of the new
Restatement struggles in the Comments to overcome the difficulties
presented by "engages in conduct,""' but the need to explain would
be greatly reduced by use of the concept of "acting with the belief
that a consequence is substantially certain to result from that act."
103. See supra Part I.A.
104. MODELPENAL CODE § 1.13(2) (1962).
105. In the Random House Dictionary of the English Language, the meaning of "purposeful"
includes "determined" and "purposely" includes "deliberately." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY,
supra note 31, at 1570.
106. Discussion Draft, supra note 4, § 1(a).
107. Id.
108. See supra Part III.A.1.
109. The draft could simply read "An actor's causation of harm is intentional if the actor de.
sires to bring about that harm ...."
110. See Discussion Draft, supra note 4, § 1.
111. See id.§ 1 cmts. c &d.
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In parallel fashion to the introduction of the empty term
"purposefully" in connection with desire-based intent, section 1 in-
troduces "knowledge" as an empty term in connection with belief-
based intent. Given that knowing is always believing in this
draft," 2 "knowingly" and "knowledge" could just as well be "poo-
poo."1 3 But here the use of "knowledge" as an empty term is more
than simply whimsical, inasmuch as "knowledge" is the chief his-
torical rival of "belief' in this context. As explained earlier, the two
terms have different meanings that should preclude their employ-
ment as synonyms." 4
B. The Discussion Draft's Definition of Recklessness
The Discussion Draft defines the concept of recklessness in
Section 2:
§ 2. Reckless
An actor's conduct is reckless if:
(a) the actor knows of the risk of harm created by the actor's conduct, or knows
facts that make that risk obvious to anyone in the actor's situation, and
(b) the precaution that would eliminate or reduce that risk involves burdens that
are so slight relative to the magnitude of the risk as to render the actor's failure to
adopt the precaution a demonstration of the actor's indifference to the risk."1
Substantively, Section 2 constitutes an improvement over Section
500 of the Restatement (Second)." 6 Rather than have the "depraved
indifference" element rest on the actor's knowledge of the unusual
magnitude of the risks, measured absolutely, the draft relies on the
actor's awareness of the relative ease with which those risks can be
eliminated. The draft does not speak of the actor's "awareness," but
the ease of elimination must constitute "a demonstration of the ac-
tor's [presumably actual] indifference to the risk.""17 Thus, on the
critical issue of the actor's state of mind, the draft properly focuses
on the relative ease with which the risk could be eliminated rather
than on the absolute magnitude of the risk-presumably, even a
relatively smallish risk that materializes in harm can support a
112. See supra note 107.
113. Cf. supra note 68 and accompanying text.
114. Cf. supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
115. Discussion Draft, supra note 4, § 2.
116. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965).
117. Discussion Draft, supra note 4, § 2(b).
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finding of recklessness if the actor knows that the risk can be
eliminated at much less cost and goes ahead and acts with con-
scious indifference to the risk being thereby gratuitously created.
While this position may be conceptually sound, one wonders
whether the creation of small risks, even if knowingly gratuitous,
justifies being labeled "reckless." In this connection, it might be ap-
propriate to impose a minimal threshold on the magnitude of the
risk required for the actor to be reckless-perhaps modify "magni-
tude" in subsection (b) with "significant," and then explain in a
Comment.
CONCLUSION
On balance, this Discussion Draft's treatment of recklessness
is better than its treatment of intent. With regard to intent, the
definition should be generic-not tied to causing harm nor, by im-
plication, to the idea of wrongfulness. The Restatement (Second)'s
treatment of intent should be continued more or less intact. With
respect to recklessness, the shift of focus from the absolute magni-
tude of the risk knowingly created by the defendant's act to the ac-
tor's awareness of the relative ease with which the risk could be
avoided constitutes a real improvement. Regarding both definitions,
greater attention should be given to identifying precisely the terms
being defined, to eliminating empty terms of art, and to avoiding
the confusing use of synonyms.
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